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Abstract

This paper explores an incentive-based management system to induce
federal grazing permittees to choose sustained cattle stocking
strategies which accommodate government-set wild horse numbers and
nongrazing uses. Particular attention is paid to constraints imposed by
federal grazing statutes.

The proposed system employs increased

livestock grazing fees to induce permittees to provide increased
vegetation for consumption by wild horses and nongrazing uses.

The

negative impact of increased fees on permittee wealth is counterbalanced
with compensatory transfer payments.

Taken together, grazing fees and

compensation payments induce multiple-use compliance by
permittee-stewards and keep their discounted livestock profits intact at
some predetermined level.

SYMBOLS

Ft= perennial vegetation density int (state variable, lbs.
d.m./acre)
S

t

= cattle stocking rate int (control variable, head/acre)

Ht= wild horse population grazing the permittee's allotment int
(exogenous variable, head/acre)
Cn

s, t = vegetation consumption rate of livestock int (lbs. d.m./head/t)

c°b,t = vegetation consumption rate of wild horses int (lbs.
d.m./head/t)
Wt= livestock productivity int (lbs./head/t)
Gt= vegetation growth rate int (lbs. d.m./acre/t).
F = rate of net change in the forage stock int (eq. of motion, lbs.
d.m./acre/t)
r = exogenous, market-determined, periodic, real interest rate
pw = beef price ($/lb.)
gf = grazing fee ($/head/t)
c = sum of incidental and opportunity costs of holding livestock on
range ($/head/t)
pf= compensation for leaving vegetation ungrazed by livestock ($/lb.
d.m./t)
ph = compensation for wild horse grazing on permittee's allotment
($/lb. d.m.)

One of the most controversial environmental issues facing federal
rangeland managers is how to alleviate the grazing pressure exerted by
domestic livestock and overpopulated wild horses and burros on
deteriorating public ranges [13].

Rancher efforts to relieve the

competitive grazing pressure for their livestock by rounding up and
slaughtering wild horses and burros resulted in the passage of the Wild
Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act 2 of 1971 (WFRHBA).

The WFRHBA

protects these animals from " ••• capture, branding, harassment, or
d eath • • • 11 , 3

and directs public managers to "manage wild free-roaming

horses and burros in a manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a
thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands".
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Under legal

protection, the wild horse population increased from 17,000 in 1971 to
54,030 in 1978--about 23,000 in excess of the level that the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) determined to constitute an ecological balance
[13].
The WFRHBA authorizes the BLM to remove excess animals from
rangeland by rounding them up for private adoption, or for destruction
if no adoption demand exists or they are old, sick, or lame.
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However,

about 7,000 excess horses are backed up on rangeland for two major
reasons [13].

First, roundups have been impeded by judicial actions

brought by animal rights activists [1],[2],[13).

Second, the BLM has

not found an easy or inexpensive way to dispose of unclaimed captured
horses.

The BLM has refused to destroy them because of potentially

large public opposition.

Moreover, reduction by adoption has been

4

slowed by animal rights activists

recent success in convincing a

federal district court to order the Secretary of the Interior
(Secretary) to withhold title from adopters who intend to exploit them
Finally, Congress

for slaughter or as bucking stock in rodeos [13].

has refused to authorize the Secretary to sell horses outright after
roundup.

Hence, unclaimed captured horses (currently numbering about

8,670 [13]) must be held in federal pens at great public expense.

6

After taking the teeth out of the roundup/adoption policy, federal
courts have directed the BLM to investigate policy alternatives for
relieving the competitive grazing pressure on public rangeland in
Environmental Impact Statements [2].

Any such policy must satisfy three

major statutory mandates.
First, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act

7

of 1976 (FLPMA)

requires the BLM to allocate public rangeland vegetation to multiple
uses at high-level sustained yields.
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The multiple-use requirement has

been interpreted by federal courts to imply that a wild-horse policy can
give neither livestock nor wild horses an exalted status over the other
[l].

Hence, the two grazers must be made to coexist unless grazing

permittees elect voluntarily for nonuse of their allotments.

Moreover,

the multiple-use mandate requires that a wild-horse policy allocate
vegetation to nongrazing multiple uses competing for forage such as the
protection of ecosystems (plant, fish, and wildlife) and environmental
quality [14].
Second, the Public Rangeland Improvement Act

9

of 1978 (PRIA)

directs the BLM to implement the Experimental Stewardship Program

5

10

(ESP).

The intent of the ESP is to discover whether allowing qualified

federal grazing permittees to actively direct decisionmaking (i.e., to
determine livestock numbers and seasons of use) can improve public
rangeland conditions [11].
Third, public grazing statutes require policy " .•• to prevent
.
k 1n
. dustry ••.• .. 11
economic d isruption an d h arm tote
h western 1 1vestoc

In many ways, these statutory restrictions on grazing policy are
similar to the political constraints imposed in designing pollution
reduction policies.

In the pollution reduction arena, issues have

traditionally revolved around realigning traditional use patterns to
effect environmental quality improvement without unduly and adversely
affecting original users, often those with historical rights.

Recently,

emphasis has also been placed on incentive-based mechanisms, such as
charges- and rights- based systems, rather than systems which allocate
by fiat (e.g., standards) [4),[SJ.
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A natural concern is thus whether

an incentive-based system is a feasible means of handling the conflicts
between wild horse advocates and traditional livestock operators on
public lands.

This paper explores such a system with particular

attention to the constraints imposed by federal grazing statutes.
An incentive-based wild-horse policy satisfies the above FLPMA and

PRIA requirements by persuading permittee-stewards to voluntarily
decrease livestock when increased forage is needed for the sustenance of
wild horses and nongrazing competing uses.

The mechanism proposed in

this paper is a counterbalancing incentive system which relies on
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increased grazing fees per animal to discourage stocking when necessary.
Compensatory transfer payments are included to satisfy the statutory
mandate of preventing economic disruption to the western livestock
industry.

Ranchers who acquire grazing permits at a value that have

capitalized the net benefits from past low grazing fees stand to suffer
large financial losses if grazing fees are significantly increased
[3],[9].

Hence, the system fixes compensatory payments at levels

counterbalancing permittee financial losses from increased grazing fees
(when needed to induce multiple-use compliance).
The paper is organized as follows.

The first section develops the

analytical grazing model underpinning the wild-horse counterbalancing
incentive system.

The second section derives the system.

The last

section discusses how the system may be useful in practical application.

THE GRAZING MODEL
Suppose that the permittee is assessed a public grazing fee each
time period t for each animal stocked, gf ($/hd/t).

Suppose also that

the permittee receives compensations each period for every pound of
forage consumed by wild horses, ph ($/lb dm), and every pound of forage
left ungrazed on the allotment, pf ($/lb dm); and that the wild horse
population grazing the permittee's allotment each period, Ht' is an
exogenous policy variable controlled by the BLM consistently with the
WFRHBA.

Suppose finally that the permittee's assumed objective is to

select the cattle stocking strategy which results in a present-value
maximizing allocation of range vegetation among livestock grazing,
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wild-horse grazing, and nongrazing multiple uses over the term of an
n-year permit, subject to biological constraints on plant and animal
productivity.
The analytical formulation of this problem is
(1)

max

st

0

f

n

subject to St, Ft' Ht' pw' c

(3)

s1

= 0

i Si

~

0, and

Su,

where, Ft is the perennial vegetation density int (state variable, lbs.
d.m./acre), St is the cattle stocking rate int (control variable,
head/acre), r is an exogenous market-determined periodic real interest
rate, pw is the beef price ($/lb), Wt is animal productivity int
(lbs./head/t), c is the sum of incidental and opportunity costs of
holding livestock on range ($/head/t), Cnh,t
consumption rate (lb dm/head/t),

s1

is the wild horse forage

(SU) is the minimum (maximum)

stocking rate int (head/acre), Cns,t(Ft) is the livestock forage

.

consumption rate (lb dm/head/t), Fis the rate of net change in the
forage stock int (eq. of motion, lbs dm/acre/t), and Gt is the
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vegetation growth rate (lb dm/head/t).

Time subscripts are dropped

below where no ambiguity exists.
The first term in the integrand of equation 1, [pwWt(Ft) - (gf+c)]
St' measures periodic weight-gain profits from grazing livestock. The
second term, phCnh,t(Ft)Ht, measures the periodic compensation the
permittee receives for the forage consumed by wild horses. Finally, the
third term, pfFt' measures the periodic compensation the permittee
receives for ungrazed vegetation left to supply nongrazing uses.
Equations 4 and 5 comprise the ecological component of the grazing
model and rely on assumptions prevalent in the grazing ecology
literature [15],[16].

Equation 4 assumes that livestock productivity

per head is monotonically and linearly related to the rate of forage
consumption per head.

Equation 5 assumes that the net change in the

forage stock in a period is forage growth less total consumption by
livestock and wild horses during the period.

Forage dynamics are

assumed to remain stationary through time.
Forage growth, G(F), is assumed to be adequately described by a
pure compensation logistic model
(6)

G(F) = aF - bF 2
Forage consumption per head by livestock is assumed to follow a

"type 2" saturation functional response [10]
(7)

Cn (F) = cxF/(F + K)
s

9

where consumption is related solely to the forage stock int by a
saturation function, increasing at a decreasing rate for lower stocks
and reaching a plateau at higher stocks.

The parameter

maximum (satiation) consumption rate per animal.

ex is the

The parameter K is

inversely related to foraging efficiency since it represents the forage
level at which consumption is half of satiation.
Forage consumption per head by wild horses is assumed to follow a
"type 1" linear functional response [10]
(8) Cnh(F) = qF,
where q is a grazing efficiency coefficient.

Given the above functional

responses for G(F) and Cn (F), a linear vegetation consumption response
s

for horses is necessary for the optimization problem to generate a
unique steady state forage solution for a given combination of gf, pf,
and ph.

With uniqueness, the model can generate the combination of

incentives needed to induce the permittee to sustain a particular steady
state forage level satisfying multiple use.

Alternatively, a saturation

functional response for horses would result in the possibility of
multiple steady state forage solutions associated with a given
combination of gf and pf.

The inaccuracy of approximating a saturation

functional response with a linear response can be mitigated by choosing
a value for the linear grazing efficiency coefficient q such that the
two responses are approximately equal in the neighborhood of the target
steady state solution.
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The linearity of periodic weight-gain profits in St results from
two assumptions.

The first is that the permittee faces a perfectly

elastic demand curve for livestock output.

The second is that livestock

numbers can be costlessly adjusted within a period.

The addition of

adjustment costs renders the problem, already complicated by the
predator-prey dynamics of eq. 5, analytically intractable.

The costless

adjustment formulation is a useful approximation to the more realistic,
yet intractable, costly adjustment formulation.

Both formulations can

be expected to call for the same type of stocking adjustments to achieve
economically optimal sustained forage levels.

The difference is that

the costless stocking adjustment occurs as rapidly as possible, while
costly stocking adjustment occurs more gradually.

Hence, the grazing

model presented in this paper can speak to the direction of stocking
adjustments a permittee-steward can be induced to make to supply
nongrazing forage uses; but overestimates the rate at which they occur.
The Solution
The solution to the problem posed in equations 1-8 is found by
defining the present-value Hamiltonian ($/acre/t)

where at, the switching function, is given by

and

Atpv ($/lb. forage consumed) is the costate variable measuring the
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marginal present value of the forage stock int, and thus the
opportunity cost of consuming forage presently by marginally increasing
the density of grazers.
This is a most rapid approach problem (MRAP) which utilizes a
bang-bang livestock control sequence from equation 11 below to drive
forage to the optimal (singular) solution F * as rapidly as possible [18]

(11)

s =

SU

if

0

>0

(F > F*)

s*

if

0

= 0

(F = p*)

SL

if

0

<0

(F < F* ),

where S* is the (constant) livestock control which keeps F = F* so long
as O < s* < Su.

Since forage dynamics are assumed to be stationary and

parameters are assumed to be constant through time, the singular
solution holds for each grazing season in then-year horizon of the
problem.
The Pontryagin necessary conditions stipulate that the solution
functions S, A and F satisfy
(12)

ot

(13)
(14)

-

= 0,

which yields

Apv

=

e

A

=

e

-rt

[p W(F) - (gf+c)]/Cn (F)
w
s

-rt pwW'(F)S + e-rt[phCn'(F)H] + -rt
e
pf
Apv[G'(F) - Cns'(F)S - C~'(F)H]

(15)

s I.
F=O

=

[G(F)-Cnh(F)H]/Cns(F).

12

To maximize discounted net returns from grazing. the permittee must
balance the opportunity cost of stocking the marginal animal (LHS of
equation 13) against the present value of the marginal gain (RHS).
Equation 14 requires that the marginal present value of the forage stock
(LHS) depreciate at the sum of the rates at which the forage stock
contributes to immediate discounted revenues through livestock grazing
(first term RHS). wild horse grazing (second term). nongrazing uses
(third) and the value of forage stock accumulation (last term).
Equation 15 is the forage isocline derived by setting the equation of
motion (equation 5) equal to zero.

It requires that the singular forage

solution be drawn from stocks equilibrating the ecological component of
the grazing model.
Routine computation reduces equations 13-15 to

* - Cnh'(F * )H
(16) G'(F)

=

r

-

Equation 14 desribes a unique singular forage path F* which must be

* livestock whenever
"tracked" by stocking S* = [G(F* )-Cnh(F* )H]/Cn/F)
o(t) = 0.

The equation represents a type of "modified golden-rule

equilibrium" prevalent in renewable resource models. wherein the basic
marginal-productivity (or golden) rule governing equilibrium--that the
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marginal productivity of the renewable resource stock equal the discount
rate--is modified by stock dependent terms.

In equation 16, the

golden-rule forage stock Fgr satisfies G'(Fgr) = r.

The second LHS term

and the second and third RHS terms are the stock dependent terms
modifying Fgr as described below.
The second LHS term represents the negative impact of wild horse
grazing on the marginal productivity of forage in livestock production,

*
and hence acts to decrease the steady state forage level, F.
The second RHS term is a nonnegative "marginal livestock effect"
which captures the dependence of livestock forage consumption on the
forage stock.

The marginal livestock effect is zero when livestock

consumption does not depend on the forage stock, Cn '(F) = O; grazing
s

costs per ,animal are zero, gf = c = O; and/or wild horses consume the

* = Cnh(F*)H.
entire sustained forage yield each period, G(F)

A marginal

livestock effect greater than zero reduces the impact of the discount
rate, and thus acts to increase the steady-state forage stock.

The

effect is weak when livestock consumption depends on forage stocks but
grazing efficiency is very high.

Livestock easily find food even at

relatively low forage levels, hence, investing in high forage densities
by decreasing livestock densities is not profitable.

The singular

forage density is at (or close to) Fgr (assuming momentarily that pf=
ph = 0).

On

the other hand, the effect becomes stronger as livestock

grazing efficiency decreases since grazers benefit from higher forage
densities.

Hence, investing in forage densities higher than Fgr by

decreasing stocking densities becomes increasingly profitable.
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The third RHS term measures the ratio of the return per pound of
forage left on range to provide nongrazing services and wild horse
grazing to the return per pound of forage consumed in livestock
production.

Hence, the term reduces the impact of the discount rate and

adjusts the optimal sustained forage stock upward as the relative
profitability of supplying nongrazing services and wild horse grazing
increases.
Substituting equations 6, 7, and 8 for G(F), Cns(F), and Cnh(F),
respectively into equation 16, results in a quadratic equation in F

(17)

+

F
2bP

where P = pwmcx - (gf+c).

+

=

0

2bP

The positive root, given by the quadratic

formula, gives the singular forage solution as a function of the fixed
parameters of the grazing model
(18)

* is the standing stock remaining each
The singular forage solution, F,
period after the associated sustained yield, G(F *), is grazed by a
present-value maximizing level of livestock and an exogenously
determined wild horse population.

Hence, it is the magnitude available

to supply nongrazing uses when the grazing system is in bioeconomic
equilibrium.

15

THE COUNTERBALANCING INCENTIVE SYSTEM
The counterbalancing incentive system generates prices designed to
induce the permittee-steward to select a cattle stocking strategy
accomplishing two purposes.

First, the strategy sustains a standing

vegetation level satisfying nongrazing uses.

Second, the sustained

yield generated by the sustained vegetation level satisfies the periodic
grazing needs of a present-value maximizing level of livestock and an
exogenously determined wild horse population. The incentives are
formulated so that the permittee realizes a steady-state wealth position
consistent with some specified prior level, for example, that under
current grazing fees and no compensation for wild horses or sustained
forage.
The offsetting mechanism requires the construction of "iso-supply"
and "iso-PV" (present value) functions.

The iso-supply function gives

the combinations of pf-gf which induce the permittee to sustain the
vegetation level satisfying multiple-use, y11u_

Target forage level y11u

can be selected optimally by incorporating demand-side analyses of
multiple-use benefits.

However, this paper assumes that it is an

exogenous variable since the FLPMA requires it to be determined by
public rangeland managers.
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The wild horse population grazing the

permittee 1 s allotment is also assumed to be determined by public
rangeland managers consistently with the WFRHBA.

The wild horse

compensation rate, ph, is arbitrarily set by the government.

The iso-PV

function is composed of the pf-gf combinations which hold the present
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value of livestock profits constant at a given level.

The offsetting

price incentives are given by two equations yielding the combination of
pf-gf at the intersection of the two functions.
The !so-supply Function
Equation 18 can be inverted into an iso-supply function by fixing a
particular forage solution y11u and solving for pf as a function of
variable gf

where
a

1

= -pwm(a-2bt11u-r) + (c/cx)[(a-2bFmu_r) - (k/Fmu)(r+bt11u)] +

(q/cx)[pwmcx-c_cxph]

The iso-supply function can be shown to be inversely related to the
grazing fee gf for all positive levels of forage and wild horses.

An

inverse relationship implies that the steady-state supply is sustained
at a given forage level (and not increased) only if increases in pf or
gf are met by decreases in the other.

Increasing the wild horse

population on the permittee 1 s grazing allotment can be shown to: (1)
shift the intercept of the iso-supply curve upward (downward) when the
net return for diverting a pound of forage to livestock production,
(pwmcx - c)/cx, is greater (less) than the compensation for diverting
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the pound to wild horse grazing, ph; and (2) give the iso-supply curve a
steeper negative slope (see Figure 1).
The Iso-PV Curve
Suppose that the permittee's steady-state wealth position under the
counterbalancing incentives system is to be held constant at the
steady-state level consistent with stewardship under a fixed status quo
grazing fee, gf = gfsq; no compensation for forage supporting nongrazing
uses, pf= O; and a wild horse population of zero, i.e.
(20)

=

which is equal to

where DFt is the relevant discount factor.

The iso-PV (present value)

curve is derived by solving equation 21 for pf in terms of variable gf:

where

The tradeoff between pf and gf in the iso-PV function is positive since
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pf'(gf) = Smu/Fmu > O.

Hence, for steady-state profits to remain

constant, increases in pf or gf must be met by increases in the other.
Increasing the wild horse population on the permittee's grazing
allotment shifts the intercept of the iso-PV curve down while leaving
the slope unchanged (See Figure 2).
Offsetting Incentives
The intersection of the iso-supply and iso-PV curves gives the
counterbalancing combination (cc) of incentives (pfcc, gfcc) which
results in the supply of range vegetation satisfying multiple-use and
keeps the permittee's steady-state wealth intact.

The two formulas

calculating the counterbalancing combination are

(23)

(24)

=

=

where a , b , a , and b are defined after equations 19 and 22.
1
2
1
2

Figure

3 shows the counterbalancing combinations associated with two wild
1
2
horse populations, H and H , and an arbitrarily set wild horse
compensation, ph.

1
2
As the population increases from H to H , the

counterbalancing grazing fee, gfcc, increases while the forage
compensation, pfcc, may increase or decrease depending on the slope of
2
the iso-supply curve associated with H •
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The counterbalancing combination ensures that the sum of the total
discounted forage and wild horse compensations (TCf and TCh,
respectively) equals the difference between discounted profits earned
under the status quo, DPsq, and those earned under the fee system
without compensation, DPcc, i.e.,

where DFt is the relevant discount factor, ar

(26)

TCf

= DFt[pf ccy11u ]

(27)

TCh

= DFt[phqt'1'-il]

(28)

DPsq

*
= DFt{[pwW(F)

(29)

DPCC

= DFt{[pwW(Fmu)

*
- (gf S'4c)]S}
_ (g cc+c)]Smu}
f

Note that if the government sets ph at a relatively high level,
the intersection of the curves in Figure 3 may occur at a negative
level of pf.

In this case the forage compensation payment becomes a

tax in order to maintain the balance dictated by equation 25.
Illustration
The counterbalancing incentive system is illustrated numerically
with an application to a "typical" stocker operation on public
rangeland.

This exercize is not intended to be an empirical analysis

since the allotment specific data required to estimate the physical
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relationships in the system are not generally available.

However,

previous grazing research [15],[16] has hypothesized reasonable
parameter values which this paper adopts solely to illustrate how the
system would work if implemented and the required date were collected.
The standard values are recorded in Table I along with footnotes
detailing the sources and reasoning behind the choices.
The status guo is assumed to be permittee stewardship (i.e., the
permittee is free to optimize eq. l); a wild horse population of zero,
the current grazing fee of $.045/animal/day ($1.35 AUM); and no
compensation for ungrazed forage, pf= O.

The optimal sustained

vegetation stock and stocking rate in status guo are calculated to be F*
= 2150.2 lbs. d.m/acre and S* = .3126 head/acre.

Discounting the flow

of net benefits over a single 150 day grazing season (and assuming that
the grazing system is in equilibrium the entire season) results in a
present value of livestock production of $17.138/acre.
The government has typically sought to control livestock stocking
rates to achieve forage levels maximizing sustained vegetation yield,
ynsy [12].

Hence, it is assumed that Fmu = ynsy, which is calculated

to be 2230.5 lbs. d.m./acre.

The cattle stocking rate which sustains

ynsy through time is Smsy = .31298.

The wild horse compensation rate

is arbitrarily set at ph = $.005/lb/day.
Table II shows counterbalancing grazing fees and forage
compensations calculated for wild horse populations ranging from Oto
.5 head/acre.

The table also shows that each combination results in
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the status quo present value, $17.138/acre.

Table III demonstrates

that the total discounted compensation earmarked for the permittee over
the course of a 150 day season equals the difference between discounted
grazing profits earned under the status quo, and those earned under the
fee system without compensation.

Total compensation ranges from

$1.15/acre when the wild horse population is zero to $9.95/acre when
the population is .5 head/acre.
DISCUSSION
To swmnarize, the public rangeland manager determines the wild
horse population grazing the permittee's allotment and the sustained
vegetation level satisfying nongrazing uses.

The manager then

calculates a counterbalancing combination of grazing fee and
compensatory forage payment associated with an arbitrarily set
compensatory wild horse payment.

The counterbalancing incentives:

(1)

induce the permittee-steward to voluntarily select a sustained cattle
stocking rate acconunodating wild horse grazing and nongrazing uses; and
(2) keep the permittee's discounted livestock profits intact at a
predetermined level.

When underlying circumstances change (e.g.,

underlying biological or economic parameters change), the open-loop
structure of the underlying grazing model requires the range manager to
recalculate the grazing fee and compensation.
The sizable amount of allotment-specific information required by
the counterbalancing incentives system thwarts its practical
application.

However, limited application may be practical if the
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government uses the theoretical economic and ecological relationships
set out in the analytical model as a basis for iterating toward a
combination of grazing fee and compensation that induces the desired
cattle stocking response.

In this way, the permittee (who has more of

the required information than the government) reveals his valuation of
the opportunity costs of converting forage to various levels of
nonlivestock use.
Limited application of the system requires that the compensatory
payments be financed.

One possibility is for the government to redirect

grazing fee revenues back to permittees or to use general tax revenues.
Another possibility is to assess a fee for nonlivestock services to
specific beneficiary groups whenever they can be identified. Some
beneficiary groups are readily identified by their rent seeking
activities (i.e., lobbying and judicial activities) to promote their
interests.
The major argument against assessing beneficiary groups a
nonlivestock use fee is that it is opposed to the interpretation that
nonlivestock users give the public trust doctrine; namely that they are
entitled to enjoy nongrazing uses of public rangeland without cost.

The

major argument for assessing a nonlivestock fee is that beneficiary
groups are forced to face a portion of the social costs generated by the
uses they promote (e.g., the huge opportunity and incidental costs of
capturing and holding excess wild horses).
be more economical in their requests.

Hence, they are induced to

Moreover, donating members of
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these groups may also benefit as donations finance conservation directly
through nonlivestock fees, instead of indirectly through expensive
lobbying and judicial activities.

Finally, assessing norilivestock fees

to these groups seems symmetrically equitable in light of the grazing
fees assessed specifically to ranchers.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The Federal Land Policy and Managment Act (FLPMA) requires the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to allocate public rangeland vegetation
to multiple uses at high-level sustained yields.

The Bl.M's attempts to

satisfy the FLPMA are made difficult by the special protection given
wild horses under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (WFRHBA)
and successful judicial actions brought by animal rights activists
groups.

Under WFRHBA protection, wild horse numbers on public ranges

have increased many fold and are consistently beyond levels that the BLM
determines to constitute an ecological balance.

Judicial decisions have

exacerbated the overpopulation problem by severely limiting the measures
the BLM can take to remove excess horses.

Currently, the only

alternative seems to be capturing excess horses and holding them in
federal pens at great public expense.

Hence, large numbers of excess

horses remain to exert grazing pressure on deteriorating public ranges
to the detriment of livestock and nongrazing uses.
This paper proposed an incentive system to induce federal grazing
permittees to choose sustained cattle stocking strategies which
accommodate government-set wild horse numbers and nongrazing uses.
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The

use of an incentive system to solve the wild horse problem is compatible
with the BI.M's mandate under the Public Rangeland Improvement Act to
explore innovative grazing management systems which might provide
incentives to improve range conditions.

In a nutshell, the incentive

system uses a stick incentive in the form of increased livestock grazing
fees to induce permittees to provide increased vegetation for
consumption by wild horses and nongrazing uses.

The negative impact of

increased fees on permittee wealth is counterbalanced with a carrot in
the form of compensatory transfer payments.

Taken together, grazing

fees and compensation payments induce multiple-use compliance by
permittee-stewards and keep their discounted livestock profits intact at
some predetermined level.
Practical application of the counterbalacing incentive system is
hampered by the sizable amount of allotment-specific biological and
economic information required to compute the offsetting incentives.
However, limited application may be practical if the government uses the
theoretical economic and ecological relationships set out in the
analytical model as a basis for iterating toward a combination of
grazing fee and compensation that induces the desired cattle stocking
response.

25

Footnotes

1.

Footnote to title

2.

16 U.S.C.A. secs. 1331-1340 (1971).

3.

16 U.S.C.A. sec. 1331 (1971).

4.

16 u.s.c.A. sec. 1333(a) (1971).

5.

16 U.S.C.A. sec. 1333(b)(2)(B) (1971).

6.

Each horse costs taxpayers approximately $165 to capture and

$2.25/day to sustain in captivity.

The program has cost $92 million

since 1980 [13].
7.

43 u.s.c. sec. 1701 (1982).

8.

43 u.s.c. sec. 1732(a) (1982).

9.

43 u.s.c. sec. 1901 (1982).

10.

43 u.s.c. sec. 1908(a) (1982).

11.

43 u.s.c. sec. 1901(a)(5) (1982).

12.

President-elect Bush emphasized incentive-based environmental

management when discussing his choice for Secretary of the Interior with
the national press in Dec. 1988.
13.

43 U.S.C. sec. 315b (1982).
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Table I
Parameter Values Used in Illustration
Symbol

aa

Units

Value

day-l

0.0042

(lbs. d.m./acre)- 1day-l

9. 41E-07

Meaning
max. relative growth rate
plant growth parameter

max. livestock consumption rate

lbs. d.m./head/day

15
0.05

livestock feed conversion
livestock grazing efficiency

lbs. d.m. / acre
lbs. d.m./head/day

wild horse grazing efficiency
beef price

$/lb.

5

.0055
0.7628

average cost

$/head/day

0.156

livestock grazing fee

$/head/day

0.045
0.000154

real daily rate of interest

aa and bare assumed to be about 5 % of those values
characterizing perennial grassland of high productivity [16).

This

reflects the relatively poorer quality of public grassland cited by
Congress in the PRIA.
b A 500-600 lb. steer placed on the range is assumed to gain 3/4

lbs. per day by consuming a maximum of 15 lbs. d.m. per day
(consultation with range specialists).
cNo information was found to help select a value for K.

Hence, K

* equals the average
was selected so that the optimal stocking rate, S,
rate on WP'-lt-P.rn rangeland (0.3126 head/acre) reported in [21).
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d

q was chosen so that a linear wild horse forage consumption

response is approximately equal to a saturation response in the
neighborhood of the multiple-use forage level, Fmu = 2230.5.
saturation response is Cnh = chxFH/(F+¾).

The

The Stockman's Handbook [7]

reports that an 882 pound mature horse at rest (maintenance) will
consume chx = 13.9 lbs. of feed/day.

For lack of better information, it

is assumed that wild horses are equally efficient grazers as livestock,
i.e.,¾= 5.

Total consumption rates for increasing wild horse

populations are:
Linear response

H

Saturation response

.OS

.613

.688

.25

3.067

3.441

.so

6.134

6.881

ep

w

is the average of feeder steer prices for July and August

1987 (when steers are assumed to come off the range) [20].
f c is taken from an article in the Drovers Journal 12-17-87,

where a permit holder in Montana kept a tally of man hours invested in
the permit over a four-year period.

Valuing each hour at $5, the total

ran to about $4.68/AUM, or $0.156/head/day.
gThe grazing fee has been fixed at $1.35/AUM ($0.045/head/day)
for the last two years.
hr is the daily interest rate on AAA corporate bonds for June

1987 less the percentage change in price from June 1986-87 [6].
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Table II
Counterbalancing Payments Associated With Varying Wild Horse Populations

--------------------------------------------cc
cc
Present Valuea

Wild Horses

gf

pf

hd/ac

$/hd/t

$/lb/t

$lac

0

.07025

3.47E-6

17.14

.OS

.10772

7.36E-6

17.14

.1

.13786

1.02E-6

17.14

.15

.16263

1.23E-6

17.14

.2

.18335

1.38E-S

17.14

.25

.20094

1.49E-5

17.14

.3

.21606

1.57E-5

17.14

.35

.22919

1.62E-5

17.14

.4

• 24071

1.64E-S

17.14

.45

.25089

1.64E-S

17.14

.5

.25995

1.63E-5

17.14

---------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------a ph arbitrarily set at $0.005/lb/day.
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Table III
Total Discounted Compensationa

Wild Horses

$lac

hd/ac
0

1. 4191

1. 4191

.05

2.8875

2.8875

.1

4.2861

4.2861

.15

5.4357

5.4357

.2

6.3973

6.3973

.25

7.2135

7.2135

.3

7.9151

7.9151

.35

8.5245

8.5245

.4

9.0588

9.0588

.45

9.5312

9.5312

.5

9.9517

9.9517

a See equations 25-29.
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Figure 1:

I so-supply curves associated with increasing wild horse
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populations, H < H < H
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Figure 2:

Iso-PV curves associated with increasing wild horse
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Figure 3:

Counterbalancing incentives associated with increasing

1 < H2

wild horse populations, H
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